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Title Short Transitive Signatures for Directed Trees
Authors Philippe Camacho, Alejandro Hevia
Publication date 2012
Abstract A transitive signature scheme allows to sign a graph in
such a
way that given the signature of edges (i,j) and (j,k) it is possible to
compute the signature for the edge (i,k) without the signer's secret, thus
allowing to "compress" a path in the graph. Constructions for undirected
graphs are known but the case of directed graphs remains an open problem. A
first solution for the restricted case where the graph is a directed tree
(DTTS) was given by Yi at CT-RSA 2007. In this construction, the signature
for an edge is O(n*log (n*log n)) bits in the worst case. A year later,
Neven designed a simpler scheme based on standard signatures where the
signature size is reduced to O(n*log n) bits. Although Neven's construction
is more efficient, handling n*log(n) remains impractical for large n. In
this work, we design a new transitive signature scheme for directed trees
where for any value L>=1 and the security parameter k: - A signature for an
edge is only O(k*L) bits, where k is a security parameter. - The time to
sign a new edge or verify the signature for a path takes O(L) cryptographic
operations. - The time to compute a signature for any path in the tree takes
O(L n^{1/L}) cryptographic operations. To the best of our knowledge this is
the first construction with such trade off. In particular, we achieve
O(k*log(n))-bit signatures, as well as $O(log(n))$ time to generate edge
signatures, verify signatures for any path, and even to compute a signature
for any path in the tree. Our construction relies on a new variant of
collision resistance, which we call prefix collision resistance. A family H
is prefix collision resistant if for any h in H, given two strings A and B
equal up to position i, then a Prover can convince a Verifier that A[1..i]
is a prefix of B by sending only h(A),h(B), and a small proof. We believe
that this new primitive will lead to other interesting
applications.
Pages 35-50
Conference name The Cryptographer's Track at RSA Conference
Publisher Springer (New York, NY, USA)
Reference URL View reference page